In this paper I propose to question the Joshua Greene’s neuroethical thesis about the essentially emotional character of so-called “deontological moral judgments”. Frist, I focus on the dual process theory of moral judgment and I criticize that they are considered only and mainly intuitive and non reflective. Se condly, I question that the “utilitarian judgment” is linked to mathematical calculation and the deontological judgment is exclusively reduced to non-reflective factor of emotion. The main objection to Greene’s naturalism raised by me (...) is trying to eliminate the philosophical justification about the moral validity defended by Kant’s deontologism; meanwhile Greene reduces “deontological moral judgment” to exclusively psychological and neurophysiological factors associated with emotion. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es aclarar cuál es el fin último de la neurociencia educativa. Para ello nos adentramos en el fecundo y a veces controvertido diálogo entre neurociencia y educación que especialmente en la última década ha cobrado mayor importancia. La hipótesis que presentamos es que la introducción de la perspectiva ética contribuye positivamente a esclarecer el fin propio de la neuroeducación. A la luz de una neuroética no naturalista la educación puede abrirse a un nuevo enfoque evolutivo (...) que no reduzca el fin de la educación al simple valor adaptativo.This paper aims to clarify the main goal of neuroeducation. To do this, I focus on the fruitful but often controversial discussion between neuroscience and education, which has been especially relevant in the last decade. The hypothesis I present is that the introduction of the ethical perspective positively affects the clarification of neuroeducation´s proper end. In the light of the non-naturalistic approach to neuroethics that I hold, education could be opened up to a new evolutionary approach that does not reduce the end of education to mere adaptive value. (shrink)